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28 OCT 1971

TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
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TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

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28 OCTOBER 1971
(VOL. XXII, NO. 43)

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CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
28 OCTOBER 1971

CONTENTS

Topics and Events Given Major Attention	i
PRC IN UNITED NATIONS	
Peking Sees Vote as Victory Over U.S. "Two-Chinas Scheme" . . .	1
SINO-U.S. RELATIONS	
Peking Says Nixon Visit Arrangements "Are Proceeding Well". . .	5
INDOCHINA	
North Korean Party-Government Delegation Welcomed in Hanoi . .	9
Brezhnev in France Warns of Intrigues Against the Vietnamese .	12
DRV Deprecates President's Radio Talk, Hails Antiwar Forces . .	13
Paris Talks: Communist Media Continue Cursory Attention . . .	14
DRV Spokesman, Comment Rap U.S. Raids in DMZ, North Vietnam . .	14
USSR-INDIA	
Moscow Registers Concern Over Indo-Pakistani Situation	16
Media Report on Refugees, Heightened Border Tensions	18
KOSYGIN IN CANADA	
Increased Soviet-Canadian Economic Cooperation Stressed	20
KOSYGIN IN CUBA	
Warm Havana Welcome for Premier Reflects Cordial Relations . .	24
SINO-KOREAN RELATIONS	
Anniversary of CPV Entry into Korean War Marked in DPRK, PRC .	27
EASTERN EUROPE	
Soviet Bloc-Yugoslav Contacts Multiply Since Brezhnev Visit . .	30
Moscow, Prague Show Sensitivity on Yugoslav Maneuvers	31

CONFIDENTIAL

- 1 -

TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 18 - 24 OCTOBER 1971

Moscow (3048 items)

Kosygin in Canada	(0.2%)	13%
October Revolution	(1%)	6%
Anniversary		
Slogans		
Soviet Students Rally	(--)	6%
[Brezhnev Speech	(--)	4%]
Indochina	(5%)	3%
U.S. Zionists' Anti-Soviet Campaign	(--)	3%
China	(3%)	2%
Kekkonen in USSR	(--)	2%
Middle East	(1%)	2%

Peking (1545 items)

Domestic Issues	(33%)	40%
Indochina	(20%)	7%
South Korean Student Movement	(0.3%)	6%
2d Anniversary Somali Revolution	(--)	5%
7th Summit Conference of East & Central African Countries	(--)	4%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
28 OCTOBER 1971

- 1 -

PRC IN UNITED NATIONS

Peking's initial reaction to the 25 October UN vote on the seating of the PRC came on the 26th in a speech by Acting Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei, who on the same day had seen off Henry Kissinger at the conclusion of the latter's six-day visit. That the Chinese were willing to keep the UN representation issue separate from the plans for President Nixon's visit seemed indicated by the timing of the second Kissinger visit and by Peking's failure to link the U.S. position on the UN question with Sino-U.S. relations generally. Initial PRC comment has viewed the UN vote as a "significant victory" in foiling U.S. efforts to bring about dual Chinese representation in the world body. Peking has not taken the occasion to assess Washington's China policy in a broader context. In the only reference to President Nixon, a 26 October NCNA report cited the Western press as saying that the President personally wrote to many heads of state in behalf of "the 'two-Chinas' scheme."

Peking's reaction to the vote was foreshadowed in earlier authoritative comment stressing firm opposition to any dual representation formula. A foreign ministry statement on 20 August and a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on 25 September, declaring categorically that the PRC would have nothing to do with the United Nations unless Chiang Kai-shek's representatives were expelled, were confined to the narrow issue of UN representation. The Commentator article claimed that the U.S. resolutions aimed at dual representation reflected persisting U.S. hostility toward the Chinese, but no implications were drawn for Sino-U.S. relations. Similarly, comment on the vote has avoided broader issues involving the two countries and has pulled its polemical punches directed at the Nixon Administration. In contrast, a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on the vote lashed Japan's "reactionary Sato government" for baring "its ugly features in remaining stubbornly hostile towards the Chinese people."

PEKING SEES VOTE AS VICTORY OVER U.S., "TWO-CHINAS SCHEME"

The first monitored PRC reaction to the 25 October General Assembly vote appeared in an NCNA dispatch on the 26th singling out comment on the vote made by Acting Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei at an Iranian embassy reception. Chi hailed the favorable vote as a "victory of the people of the whole world" and a demonstration of the "bankruptcy" of the policy long pursued by "U.S. imperialism."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
28 OCTOBER 1971

- 2 -

According to the NCNA account, Chi said the Chinese government and people were grateful to Albania, Algeria, and the other 21 nations which had sponsored the resolution restoring the PRC's rights in the United Nations, to those countries which have diplomatic relations with the PRC, and to "other friendly countries" which have "upheld justice." The NCNA account of the reception did not include Chi's remarks to correspondents-- reported in the Western press on the 27th--that the PRC was giving consideration to the question of when it would take its seat in the United Nations.

Following NCNA's brief report of Chi's remarks, the first substantial comment came in a lengthy, heavily editorialized NCNA dispatch dated the 26th and carried in both domestic and international services. On the 28th a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial discussed the Assembly vote,* echoing Chi and the NCNA dispatch in calling the outcome a victory for the people of the world and a demonstration of the bankruptcy of U.S. policy.

Both the PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial and NCNA were critical of the United States and the "Sato government" for engaging in "tricks" to gain support in the Assembly for a two-Chinas "scheme," with NCNA derisively observing that U.S. and Japanese representatives during the week-long debate "were running hither and thither, just like ants on a hot pan, to exert pressure and to deceive and woo" other delegations. The NCNA dispatch cited Western press reports as saying that President Nixon personally wrote to the heads of many states, that Secretary Rogers and Ambassador Bush "hustled" around with promises of U.S. favors or hints of withdrawal of U.S. aid, and that U.S. senators had threatened that Washington would reduce its funds to the world body if the Albanian resolution were adopted. Japan also dispatched "important personages to join its UN delegation and coordinated with the United States in its vote-seeking effort," according to NCNA.

The NCNA dispatch--which noted that the final vote was welcomed with "cheers" and "prolonged warm applause"--drew on U.S. news reports for the statements that the Administration was "caught

* In the three previous years, Peking's comment on the voting on the representation issue had been conveyed in heavily editorialized NCNA dispatches. The 1967 vote occasioned a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article, and the votes in 1965 and 1966 were discussed in PEOPLE'S DAILY editorials.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
28 OCTOBER 1971

- 3 -

by surprise" and "expressed strong disappointment." And like the PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial, NCNA said that the U.S. press has called the vote the "worst U.S. defeat in UN history." NCNA added that Ambassador Bush, in a statement after the vote, said "despondently that this is a 'moment of infamy,'" at the same time admitting that the votes which have been cast "represent the views of the majority of UN members."

On the 27th NCNA transmitted the text of the Albanian resolution, listing the 76 nations which voted for it while singling out only the United States and Japan among the 35 that voted against it. The same NCNA transmission listed the 59 states voting against the "important question" resolution "concocted by the United States in collusion with the Sato government of Japan."

OTHER COMMUNIST COMMENT Moscow has welcomed the outcome of the 25 October vote in a moderate volume of comment calling it a step toward realism, at the same time assailing Washington's "arm-twisting" methods and pointing to consistent Soviet support over the years for seating the PRC in the United Nations. The most authoritative commentary to date is a PRAVDA article on the 28th by Viktor Sokolov, which said that the seating of the PRC and expulsion of the Chiang Kai-shek representatives are "linked with the hope that the United Nations will be more effectively carrying into life the principles of its charter." The article replayed the pervasive theme that the USSR has consistently pressed for restoration of the PRC's rights in the organization, "whatever the state of relations with the Chinese leadership." A foreign-language radio commentary by Yuriy Soltan on the 26th had paraphrased, without attribution, Soviet Ambassador Malik's remarks during the debate to the effect that the Soviet Union supported the seating of the PRC even though Soviet relations with the Chinese leadership have at times assumed "a sharply ideological and political character."

A substantial body of comment by Moscow's East European allies has also stressed the bloc's long-standing support of Peking's seating and assails the U.S. maneuvers on the representation issue. Some of the comment has gone beyond Moscow's in pointing up the new responsibility now resting on Peking. Thus an article in Warsaw's TRYBUNA LUDU on the 27th expressed hope that the PRC representatives will join with the socialist and other peace-loving states in solving complicated international problems. It should be expected that Chinese diplomacy will bring a constructive contribution to the world body, the article said, adding that it is further hoped that Peking will cooperate in the checking of the arms race, in the discontinuation of nuclear tests, and in the nonproliferation of nuclear arms.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
28 OCTOBER 1971

- 4 -

Similar East German comment has also predictably taken the occasion to call for admission to the United Nations of those states which are being kept out due to the policy of "discrimination" pursued by the United States.

Bucharest's press and radio have hailed the vote as an expression of justice and political realism, and a congratulatory message on the 26th from Ceausescu and Maurer to Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai cites the vote as supporting the Romanian line that a lasting solution of major international problems cannot be conceived without the participation of the PRC. In addition to the Romanians, the Albanian and North Korean leaderships, Yugoslav Premier Bijedic, and Polish Premier Jaroszewicz have sent congratulatory messages to their Chinese counterparts. Lin Piao was not an addressee of any of these messages.

The DRV's first reaction came in a Hanoi domestic service broadcast on the 28th which said public opinion in many countries regards the vote as a victory for the PRC and the peace-loving peoples of the world and "a disastrous setback for the U.S. imperialists." Citing AFP, the broadcast noted that Secretary Rogers in his 26 October press conference had declared that the expulsion of the ROC from the world body would not affect U.S. relations with the Chiang Kai-shek regime. No DRV congratulatory message has been monitored as of this writing.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
28 OCTOBER 1971

- 5 -

SINO-U.S. RELATIONS

PEKING SAYS NIXON VISIT ARRANGEMENTS "ARE PROCEEDING WELL"

Conveying a sense of momentum in Sino-U.S. developments in the wake of the second Kissinger mission from 20 to 26 October, Peking announced on 28 October (afternoon of the 27th Washington time) that arrangements for President Nixon's visit "are proceeding well" and that another announcement is expected "in the near future." Unlike reports on the Kissinger delegation's arrival on the 20th, which were carried in the middle of Peking newcasts, the 28 October announcement was broadcast as the lead item by the domestic radio.

While predictably avoiding direct comment on the President's projected visit, Peking reported the second Kissinger mission in such a way as to signal that ongoing Sino-U.S. developments are not affected by the current internal anomalies in China. NCNA dispatches on 20 October, disseminated in both domestic and international services, reported Kissinger's arrival that day--to make "concrete arrangements" for the President's visit--and his talks with Chou En-lai followed by a banquet on the same day "to entertain Dr. Kissinger and his party." To bring the point even further home to the Chinese people, and perhaps to recalcitrant elements in the leadership, PEOPLE'S DAILY on the 21st carried two photographs of the U.S. delegation with Chou and other Chinese leaders.

In addition to the premier, the Chinese officials at the announced talks on the 20th included Politburo member Yeh Chien-ying, vice chairman of the party's Military Affairs Committee, and Acting Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei. Yeh, the ranking military leader currently appearing in public, and Chi met the Americans at the airport on their arrival and saw them off on the 26th.

In addition to the 28 October announcement, there were three Peking reports on the visit, covering the arrival, the talks and banquet on the 20th, and the departure. Apart from noting that the delegation came to the PRC to make arrangements for President Nixon's visit, there was no characterization of the atmosphere or the substance of the talks. Though there were no other specifications of when talks were held, the departure announcement noted that during "intervals between the talks"

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
28 OCTOBER 1971

- 6 -

the delegation "visited various places" and attended a theatrical performance in Peking. Chou was not reported as making any other appearances during the period of the delegation's stay.*

SINO-SOVIET-U.S. TRIANGLE The Chinese may have been pleased with the timing of the Kissinger delegation's arrival coincident with the second anniversary-- unmarked by either Peking or Moscow--of the opening of the Sino-Soviet border talks. In the course of the movement toward Sino-American negotiations, Peking has exhibited an awareness of the uses of this development for its position in the triangular relationship. This was reflected, for example, two months after the Sino-Soviet talks had opened at a time when both sides were leaking reports of difficulties in the border negotiations. Peking's announcement on 14 December 1969 of the chief Soviet negotiator's departure for home--an announcement contrived to put pressure on Moscow to return the negotiator soon--was pointedly juxtaposed in the same NCNA international service transmission with a belated report (three days after the fact) of a meeting in Warsaw between the U.S. and PRC diplomatic representatives. That meeting led to the resumption, after a lengthy hiatus, of the Sino-U.S. ambassadorial talks running parallel with the protracted Sino-Soviet border talks.

The Warsaw talks were suspended after the U.S. incursion into Cambodia in the spring of 1970, but there was new movement in Sino-U.S. relations following the Lam Son 719 operation in southern Laos in February-March this year and the emergence of what Peking began calling an "unprecedentedly fine situation" in Indochina. After a series of developments ranging from the visit of American table tennis players to the PRC in April to the July announcement of President Nixon's forthcoming trip, Peking presented an analysis of its strategy as requiring maximum flexibility in distinguishing among its adversaries in order to isolate "the main enemy." By implication, Peking identified the Soviet Union as its principal antagonist and justified its dealings with the United States on the basis of changes in U.S.

* Chou appeared at an Iranian embassy reception on the evening of the 26th at which Chi Peng-fei offered Peking's initial comment on the UN vote. NCNA reported on the 27th that Chou had "a friendly talk with American friendly personage John S. Service" that day.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
28 OCTOBER 1971

- 7 -

policy that offered a counterbalance to the Soviets.* Thus Peking may have hoped that Moscow read the American delegation's arrival date as a reminder of the triangular facts of international life.

SOVIET BLOC COMMENT Moscow followed the Kissinger visit with brief reports of the announced activities, but there has been no comment in the central media. A Radio Moscow broadcast to China on 26 October, discussing the previous jay's UN vote on seating the PRC, took note of Sino-U.S. developments in accusing Washington of hypocrisy in its China policy as evidenced by its efforts to develop contacts with Peking while maintaining its relationship with the Nationalist Chinese regime. The day before Kissinger arrived in Peking, a broadcast to the Chinese contrasted what it portrayed as significant Soviet support for the PRC and Washington's hostility from the time that the PRC was founded. The broadcast contained a rare reference to the moribund Sino-Soviet treaty of alliance, noting that economic and other support provided by the Soviets in line with the treaty enabled the PRC to overcome the Western economic blockade.

In a notable allusion by a top Soviet leader to Sino-U.S. developments, Brezhnev took the occasion of a speech in Paris on the 27th to warn against attempts to impose a Vietnam settlement "by way of secret combinations behind the Vietnamese people's back."** Current Soviet comment has not spelled out implications of Sino-U.S. relations for third parties, but some East European comment has expressed misgivings over the effects of these developments. A 25 October commentary in Prague's RUDE PRAVO on the second Kissinger mission explained that the "anti-imperialist forces" view these developments with disquiet because Washington undertook normalization of relations with the PRC out of consideration of the "schismatic and anti-Soviet orientation" of Peking policy. Nothing has changed in that respect, "as Kissinger has seen for himself with satisfaction," the commentary concluded.

* Peking's analysis is discussed in the TRENDS of 18 August, pages 19-22.

** Brezhnev's remark is discussed in the Indochina section of the TRENDS.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
28 OCTOBER 1971

- 8 -

An article on 20 October in a minor Polish paper, DZIENNIK LUDOWY, a peasant organ, linked the anniversary of the opening of the Sino-Soviet border talks, the Kissinger mission, and Indochina in musing over the past two years' developments in Sino-Soviet relations. After discussing Sino-Soviet developments, the article took note of Kissinger's arrival in Peking that day, an event "which gives one food for thought." Specifically, the article suggested the thought--which "must be uppermost in the minds of the Indochinese people"--of how more advantageous would be the position of the communist states vis-a-vis the imperialists if the Sino-Soviet talks had produced real progress.

OTHER COMMUNIST
REACTION

The second Kissinger visit has not been mentioned by Hanoi, which has never explicitly acknowledged Peking's invitation to the President while indirectly castigating it, or by Pyongyang, which has endorsed Peking's invitation. Peking's Albanian ally briefly reported the Kissinger mission. In the wake of the original announcement on the President's visit, Tirana had taken the occasion of the anniversary of the 1954 Geneva agreements on 20 July to warn that the Nixon Administration cannot be trusted and that the United States is "the main, the most perfidious, and the most ferocious enemy of the peoples."

Havana has reported the Kissinger visit without comment. Some Cuban reports have noted that President Nixon plans to visit both Peking and Moscow.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
28 OCTOBER 1971

- 9 -

INDOCHINA

In the wake of the 24-28 September visit of Li Hsien-nien's Chinese economic delegation and the 3-8 October visit of Soviet President Podgornyy, DRV leaders are currently playing host to a North Korean party-government delegation led by Politburo member and Vice Premier Pak Song-chol. References to DRV-DPRK solidarity and friendship pervade the propaganda, with no overt manifestation of their diametrically opposed reactions to Peking's invitation to President Nixon--welcomed by Kim Il-song on 6 August as a "great victory" for the Chinese people and world revolutionary forces, at the time Hanoi in its vitriolic polemic was implying that the PRC had departed from a proletarian internationalist path.

Soviet party chief Brezhnev at a Paris dinner for President Pompidou on 27 October made a thinly veiled allusion to possible Sino-U.S. collusion on Indochina when he warned that the problem cannot be solved "either by attempts to impose an alien will on Vietnam by means of force or by way of secret combinations behind the backs of the Vietnamese people." Brezhnev again pledged Soviet support so long as the Indochinese struggle continues. And Moscow broadcasts continue to cite President Podgornyy's visit to Hanoi, during which the annual Soviet-DRV aid agreements were signed, as testimony of the USSR's unabated loyalty to the DRV and the national liberation movement.

U.S. failure to respond positively to the PRG's 1 July proposal and to totally withdraw from South Vietnam continues to be scored by the Vietnamese communist delegates at Paris as well as in routine propaganda. And a Hanoi radio talk characterizes the President's remarks on ending the war, in his 24 October radio talk marking Veterans Day, as "flowery words" aimed at deceiving American and world opinion.

NORTH KOREAN PARTY-GOVERNMENT DELEGATION WELCOMED IN HANOI

Pyongyang media gave no advance notice concerning the visit to the DRV of a party-government delegation. On 24 October, the day of the delegation's departure, KCNA reported that in response to the invitation of the Central Committee of the VWP and the DRV Government, a six-man party-government delegation headed by Pak Song-chol, Politburo member and second vice premier, departed Pyongyang for a "friendship visit to the DRV."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
28 OCTOBER 1971

- 10 -

NCNA reported the same day that the delegation briefly stopped at the Peking airport, where they were met by Politburo member Li Hsien-nien who hosted lunch. Later on the 24th the delegation was welcomed at the Hanoi airport by a Vietnamese delegation headed by Nguyen Duy Trinh, Politburo member and Foreign Affairs Minister. An evening banquet featured speeches by Trinh and Pak with Premier Pham Van Dong in attendance.

Premier Dong participated in official talks with the delegation on the 25th and 26th. VNA portrayed the talks as having proceeded "in an atmosphere of sincerity, militant solidarity, and fraternal friendship." A "grand meeting" to welcome the DPRK delegation was held by the "Hanoi population" on 25 October at a local meeting hall. Trinh, who headed the Vietnamese turnout, stressed the theme that "Vietnam and Korea share the same plight of temporary division of the country, are facing up to the same enemy--the U.S. imperialist aggressors--and share the same ideal of socialism and communism." Activities of the DPRK delegation on the 26th included attendance at an art performance hosted by the culture ministry, wreath-laying ceremonies at the Hanoi monument to war dead, and a visit to Ho Chi Minh's home.

PROLETARIAN
INTERNATIONALISM

Foreign Minister Trinh in his banquet speech on the 24th presented an optimistic picture of relations with the DPRK and other members of the socialist world. He referred to the fruitful development of Vietnamese-Korean friendship on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, suggested a toast to the "solidarity" of the socialist countries and the international communist and workers movement on this basis, and carefully specified both the Soviet Union and China in referring to support from the socialist countries. These are orthodox, standard formulations and are consistent with Hanoi propaganda during the Podgorny visit. They are noteworthy only against the background of Hanoi's July-August implications that Peking, in extending the invitation to the President, was departing from a proletarian internationalist path. Even after Hanoi ceased its anti-Chinese polemic at the end of August, it remained reluctant to describe Sino-U.S. relations as based on proletarian internationalism--a reluctance dramatically demonstrated during Li Hsien-nien's late-September visit. While Hanoi must have been irked by Kim Il-song's endorsement of Peking's invitation to President Nixon,* its current propaganda now presents a DPRK-DRV relationship of "militant solidarity" and "warm" friendship.

* See the TRENDS of 11 August 1971, pages 13-15.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
28 OCTOBER 1971

- 11 -

Pak Song-chol in his speech at the banquet referred to Korean "loyalty" to proletarian internationalism in a passage in which he said that the Korean people regard the struggle of the Vietnamese people as an encouragement to their own revolutionary cause and "will continue doing their utmost to give moral and material assistance to the fraternal Vietnamese people until their final victory." Pak followed this assertion with a repetition of the line on Asian unity promulgated by Peking and Pyongyang which implicitly excludes the Soviet Union. He reiterated that U.S. imperialism will be driven out of the countries of Asia in the face of the "joint fight of the Korean people, the Vietnamese people, the Lao people, the Cambodian people, and the Chinese people." Speaking at the Hanoi meeting the next day, he similarly referred to Asian unity, and in another passage promised continued "active aid" to the Vietnamese people.

Some seeming inconsistencies in Hanoi's line on Chinese adherence to proletarian internationalism have come to light in recent propaganda. After having studiously avoided references to the concept during Li Hsien-nien's visit, DRV leaders did refer to proletarian internationalism in their congratulatory message marking the 1 October PRC National Day.* However, they dropped the declaration contained in the 1970 anniversary message that mutual friendship between the two peoples had been "unceasingly consolidated and developed" on this basis. As reported by NCNA, a Vietnamese official of the friendship association at a 29 September meeting said that the Vietnamese "are determined to do their utmost to nurture the fraternal friendship and militant solidarity between our two peoples based on Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. . . ." Hanoi media failed to publicize this statement, but the omission seems less significant in light of a similar pledge in an article on DRV diplomacy by Foreign Minister Trinh in the October issue of the party journal HOC TAP. Trinh said: "We will strive to strengthen our militant solidarity and friendly relations with the brother socialist countries, especially the Soviet Union and China, on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism."

* See the TRENDS of 29 September 1971, pages 4-5, and of 6 October 1971, pages 2-3.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
28 OCTOBER 1971

- 12 -

BREZHNEV IN FRANCE WARNS OF INTRIGUES AGAINST THE VIETNAMESE

Moscow's restrained treatment of the United States in the wake of the announcement of the President's forthcoming visit to the Soviet Union appeared to have been reflected in Brezhnev's speech at a dinner given by President Pompidou on the 25th. Avoiding criticism of U.S. foreign policy, the Soviet party chief remarked that his visit to France was taking place "in a complex situation" and added mildly that "the war in Indochina is continuing and the Middle East crisis is still unsettled."

But Brezhnev showed no such restraint in a speech on the 27th that he hosted for Pompidou. He called U.S. "aggression" in Indochina one of the most serious obstacles to peace, and said that the way to settle the conflict is "to end foreign interference" in that part of the world. And, in the first such statement by a top Soviet leader, he went on to declare: "This problem cannot be solved either by attempts to impose an alien will on Vietnam by means of force, or by way of secret combinations behind the Vietnamese people's back." As would be expected in the circumstances, he mentioned neither the United States nor China by name. Gromyko in his 28 September UNGA speech explicitly discussed Sino-U.S. relations and went on to raise the specter of "combinations" of states directed against others in a general context without mentioning Vietnam.* Brezhnev's remarks seem particularly notable coming against the background of Kissinger's return from his second trip to Peking as well as the UN vote on the seating of the PRC--developments which dramatize the PRC's expanding role in world affairs.

In his brief statement on the "correct" way to settle the Indochinese question, Brezhnev said nothing about the PRG's 1 July seven-point proposal. Authoritative Moscow press reaction in July and August to the announcement of the President's Peking visit had charged that it eased pressure on Washington to respond to the 1 July peace proposal.**

* This passage was included in extracts of Gromyko's speech distributed by TASS but it was excised from the version of the speech published in the central press. See the TRENDS of 6 October, page 41.

** Moscow had endorsed the PRG proposal in a PRAVDA editorial on 5 July--the day after PEOPLE'S DAILY's editorial endorsement. Both Gromyko in his UNGA speech and Podgornyy in a 3 October speech in Hanoi criticized U.S. failure to respond to the proposal.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
28 OCTOBER 1971

- 13 -

DRV DEPRECATES PRESIDENT'S RADIO TALK, HAILS ANTIWAR FORCES

At this writing Vietnamese communist media have not publicized antiwar demonstrations in Washington marking the Veterans Day weekend. But VNA on 27 October did report what it described as a "recent" message from Hoang Minh Giam, chairman of the Vietnam Committee for Solidarity with the American People, hailing the "fall offensive."

President Nixon's 24 October radio talk marking the Veterans Day holiday prompts a Hanoi domestic service broadcast on the 26th which ridicules the President's remarks that the United States is ending the war and proceeding toward preventing the outbreak of others, and that there is now a greater chance to make the present U.S. Vietnam veterans the last war veterans. Hanoi observes that the President "hoped that his flowery words" would deceive American and world opinion. And it goes on to counter his assertion that the war is ending by describing continued U.S. bombing and other military action throughout Indochina. The broadcast does not specify the various steps spelled out by the President which he said moved toward peace, and it of course ignores his remarks that his trips to Moscow and Peking are directed toward that end.

Hanoi also takes issue with the President's contention that the antiwar movement opposes U.S. servicemen and veterans. It says that he "brazenly distorted the truth about the American people's antiwar movement" which in fact, it adds, has "gained the sympathy of many servicemen and veterans." The radio claims that "heedless of Nixon's boastful arguments," the people are "actively making preparations for the fall struggle movement" to demand an end to the war and repatriation of all U.S. troops.

The Hoang Minh Giam message on the fall offensive--a routine propaganda exercise at times of U.S. antiwar campaigns--says that after the impetus of the spring antiwar activities, the "ongoing fall offensive has destroyed the myth created by the American warlike circles that the peace movement is dying." The message, carried by VNA on the 27th, claims that the antiwar struggle underlines the fact that the American people "will not be deceived by any political lie," that they will "have the last word to achieve their demands and will remove all those who go counter to their tradition of peace and justice." Giam also routinely called on the U.S. Administration to respond to the PRG's seven-point peace proposal.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
28 OCTOBER 1971

- 14 -

PARIS TALKS: COMMUNIST MEDIA CONTINUE CURSORY ATTENTION

Vietnamese communist media's attention to the Paris talks is confined to the cryptic LPA and VNA accounts of the sessions. Consistent with recent practice, the VNA account of the 21 October session dismisses Ambassador Porter's statement in a single sentence, saying that he "continued to maintain his aggressive and colonialist stand." And VNA totally ignores the GVN statement.

PRG delegate Nguyen Van Tien's statement is again replete with criticism of Ambassador Porter, but the VNA account omits or softens many of his remarks. Tien repeatedly criticized Porter "for over the past five sessions rehashing the shop-worn allegations of his predecessors, distorting facts and making black white." VNA notes that Tien denounced the U.S. delegate for trying "by hook or crook to prettify" President Thieu and the recent election. But it ignores Tien's charge that Porter "even wants to negate the South Vietnamese people's great resistance to U.S. aggression, led by the NFLSV and the PRG"--an obvious reference to the Ambassador's assertions that the NFLSV has little real influence in South Vietnam militarily or politically. VNA also ignores DRV delegate Nguyen Minh Vy's question to Porter asking "how he can deny that at this conference table he has been resorting to the arguments of a colonialist aggressor to continue to hinder the work of the conference."

Vy's statement consisted largely of charges of "fresh U.S. war acts" against the Indochinese countries, and he described the upcoming trip to South Vietnam by Defense Secretary Laird, Admiral Moorer and General Westmoreland as evidence that the Nixon Administration "is scheming to take new military adventures."

DRV SPOKESMAN, COMMENT RAP U.S. RAIDS IN DMZ, NORTH VIETNAM

The DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman on 22 October issues the most recent in its series of protests against U.S. strikes in the DMZ and North Vietnam. The statement charges that from 16 to 20 October, U.S. planes including B-52's attacked Huong Lap village and U.S. artillery from "south of the demilitarized zone" and U.S. ships shelled Vinh Giang and Vinh Son villages. The three villages, described as being "north of the 17th

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
28 OCTOBER 1971

- 15 -

parallel" were also the subject of the two most recent foreign ministry spokesman protests on 9 and 16 October. The current protest also says that on the 18th and 19th U.S. aircraft "bombed populated areas" in Tuyen Hoa and Minh Hoa districts, Quang Binh Province.

The charges voiced in the foreign ministry spokesman's protest are echoed in a 23 October Hanoi radio commentary. It is unclear why this particular protest prompted comment when none followed the four previous similar protests in the past month. The commentary recalls the intensive 21 September raids--which had been protested at the higher level of a DRV Foreign Ministry statement on the 22d--calling them a "typical case" of repeated U.S. "crimes" against the people of Vinh Linh and Quang Binh. It also recalls that the Administration used the "extremely overbearing and odious allegation" of self-defense reaction to justify those acts.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
28 OCTOBER 1971

- 16 -

USSR - INDIA

MOSCOW REGISTERS CONCERN OVER INDO-PAKISTANI SITUATION

In the month since Prime Minister Gandhi's 27-29 September state visit to the Soviet Union,* Soviet media's treatment of events in the Indian subcontinent has evolved from an outpouring of Soviet public sentiment in support of the refugees streaming into India, underscoring sympathy with India's position, to expressions of unconcealed concern that the Indian-Pakistani confrontation may result in war. The propaganda sustains its pro-Indian character, though tempered now by exhortations for mutual restraint.

Declaring that "both sides were in full agreement in assessing the situation," the statement issued following 22-25 October "consultations" in New Delhi between Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Firyubin and Indian officials, including Prime Minister Gandhi, reflected both the continuing Soviet support for the Indian position and increased mutual concern over the explosiveness of the border situation. The "consultations," according to the statement released on the 27th by TASS and INFORMATION SERVICE of INDIA, were held "in connection with the tense situation which has arisen on the Indian subcontinent and which endangers peace in that part of the world."

The statement specified that the discussions were held "in accordance with the existing practice of biannual, bilateral consultations and with Article 9 of the Soviet-Indian treaty of peace, friendship, and cooperation." Article 9 provides that in the event of an attack or a threat of attack the two parties "will immediately start mutual consultations with a view to eliminating this threat and taking appropriate effective measures to ensure peace and security for their countries." INFORMATION SERVICE of INDIA cited an official spokesman as saying it was India which "had invoked" Article 9. A New Delhi broadcast on the 28th reported that the P.S. Kutakhov, commander-in-chief of the Soviet air force, was scheduled to arrive in the Indian capital the next day for a six-day visit.

* The visit is reviewed in the TRENDS of 6 October, pages 26-30.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
28 OCTOBER 1971

- 17 -

Soviet concern over the situation had been registered in the joint communique publicized on 26 October at the end of Kosygin's visit to Canada. The communique called--as Moscow has done repeatedly before--for a "political settlement" in East Pakistan "that would take into account the legitimate rights and interests of its population and would facilitate a speedy and secure return of the refugees," but it added now that "this would be facilitated if the interested parties exercised restraint." Thus in a formal document to which India was not a party, Moscow sharpened the thrust of earlier statements by Soviet leaders on the necessity for both Pakistan and India to display the prudence necessary to forestall military hostilities. In a speech on 14 September, at a dinner for the king of Afghanistan, Podgorny had declared that a political solution to the East Pakistan situation would depend on, among other things, "the readiness of the leaders of the region's states to prevent the occurrence of a slide toward military conflict"; and Gromyko in his 28 September UNGA address expressed the Soviet Government's hope that the East Pakistan problem would not reach "the stage of a military clash" and that "restraint and reason will prevail."

A measure of retrenchment from the strong, unequivocally pro-Indian posture that had been in evidence during Prime Minister Gandhi's visit was registered on 8 October in another formal document to which India was not a party. Thus in the Soviet-Algerian joint statement of that date the two sides declared their respect for "the national unity and territorial integrity" of both India and Pakistan and appealed to them to peacefully solve their problem "in conformity with the principles of non-interference, mutual respect, good neighborly relations and the spirit of the Tashkent meeting." References to the Tashkent spirit have been rare, and Moscow had not previously committed itself to "the national unity and territorial integrity" of Pakistan. The Soviet-Algerian communique, unlike the Soviet-Canadian document, made no reference to the situation in East Pakistan, the refugees in India, or "the resulting tension" in that area. The Soviet-Moroccan communique of 10 October and the Soviet-Egyptian communique of 13 October both evaded the problem of formulating a mutually acceptable passage on the East Pakistan situation by omitting the issue entirely, possibly as a result of India's expressed dissatisfaction with the nature of the Soviet-Algerian joint statement.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
28 OCTOBER 1971

- 18 -

MEDIA REPORT ON REFUGEES, HEIGHTENED BORDER TENSIONS

During the first two weeks of October, immediately following the Indian prime minister's visit to the Soviet Union, Moscow media gave extensive coverage to appeals, statements, and mass meetings by Soviet organizations demanding an end to alleged reprisals and atrocities in East Pakistan and the release of Awami League leader Mujibur Rahman. While propaganda of that nature has since been phased out, Moscow has sustained its reportage and comment on the unceasing flow of refugees into India, Indian and Soviet aid to the refugees, and continued reprisals in East Pakistan.

A 10 October PRAVDA article by Borisov, "The Roots of the Crisis," maintained that despite the Awami League's electoral victory "the military administration" of Pakistan "unilaterally broke off" the Yahya Khan-Mujibur consultations on 25 March and that "at the order of the military authorities the army brought repression on the Bengalese population of East Pakistan, using tanks, aircraft, and rocket projectiles." Citing the more than nine million refugees as personifying "the scale of the terror and the bloody repressions," Borisov asserted that the flow of refugees is not diminishing, indicating that "the army is continuing its reprisal against the peaceful inhabitants."

Similarly, contending that the crux of the matter was "the cruel reprisals" in East Pakistan, a Moscow Radio Peace and Progress commentary on 16 October declared that "people who are interested in peace and justice" are demanding that "the reprisals" by the "Pakistani authorities" be stopped, that the rights of the local population be reinstated, and that Mujibur and other Awami League leaders be freed. Picking up the Pakistani claim that India is preventing refugees from returning to East Pakistan, TASS on the 18th reported from Calcutta that thousands of refugees continue to enter India daily and that several families desiring to return to East Pakistan "were fired upon by Pakistani soldiers when they were crossing the border." TASS added that "millions of refugees would hardly leave India until the situation in East Pakistan was normalized."

In recent weeks Moscow media have emphasized the intensification of tension along the Indian-Pakistani borders and have generally put the onus on Pakistan for prolonging and heightening the crisis. TASS has continued to utilize the device of a single TASS dispatch juxtaposing reports from New Delhi and Karachi trading

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
28 OCTOBER 1971

- 19 -

charges of hostile military acts, but the dispatches have devoted increasing space to the Indian reports and have generally depicted Indian military activities as being reactive or responsive to Pakistani troop movements or attacks.

Pressing the theme that the key to a solution is a political settlement in East Pakistan "with due account for the inalienable rights and legitimate interests of its people," Soviet comment has continued to call on the Pakistani authorities for a redress of the situation. TASS on 15 October observed that "certain representatives of the Pakistani military administration continue to make statements fomenting tension and preventing a normalization of the situation." And a Radio Peace and Progress commentary on 23 October compared the current buildup of tension to that which occurred in the fall of 1965 and recalled Kosygin's 28 September assertion that "it is impossible to justify" the actions of the Pakistani authorities.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
28 OCTOBER 1971

- 20 -

KOSYGIN IN CANADA

INCREASED SOVIET-CANADIAN ECONOMIC COOPERATION STRESSED

Premier Kosygin's visit to Canada from 17 to 26 October, the first by a head of the Soviet Government, is portrayed by Moscow media as a "new step" in developing political and economic relations between the Soviet Union and Canada. Statements by Kosygin, the joint communique, and commentaries on the visit stress that a firm basis for future political consultations and, more significantly, mutually advantageous economic cooperation has been established. Monitored Moscow media failed to report Kosygin's remarks on the 19th in which he pointedly criticized, without naming, the United States for its Vietnam and new economic policies; he asserted that the latter are causing unemployment and economic stagnation in other countries and are the consequence of U.S. mistakes in carrying out policies "of tension and conflict in various parts of the world." In general, Moscow media have continued to refrain from making any effort to play off the developing Soviet-Canadian relationship against the United States. Both Kosygin in his public remarks and Moscow media generally sought to downplay the anti-Soviet demonstrations by ethnic groups; and toward the end of the visit Moscow even began to cite messages of support from Jewish and East European groups in Canada.

ECONOMIC RELATIONS Kosygin told a meeting of the Canadian Manufacturers Association on the eve of his departure that the May 1971 protocol on the exchange of information on political issues is a "very important document." The USSR is "strictly adhering" to it, he said, and is "satisfied with the progress of its fulfillment."

In regard to economic cooperation, however, the Soviet leader stressed that "it must be said" that the two countries have not studied each other sufficiently and "know little of those channels which should link" them together; "it is obviously difficult to bring this about immediately," he acknowledged. Then Kosygin made an apparent allusion to the United States--reported by TASS--to the effect that Canada now utilizes "contacts which took shape over years"; but this "was also the case with those European capitalist countries with which we now maintain close economic relations," he said.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
28 OCTOBER 1971

- 21 -

According to the TASS report, Kosygin listed three areas in which the USSR and Canada "can always find a basis for the development of economic contacts"--the power industry, engineering, and metallurgy. (In a Montreal radio recording of this speech, broadcast in Russian on the 26th, Kosygin did not name these three categories but stated only that Soviet industrial development is making it possible to expand its "electronics industry" and to sell such products abroad. Kosygin, reading from a prepared text, was interrupted by a protestor in the audience.)

Soviet interest in possible economic cooperation in the field of metallurgy was shown by Kosygin's visit to a nickel refinery during his brief visit to Edmonton on the 24th. TASS reported that the mining company owning the refinery welcomed the possibility of participating in a program of cooperation with the Soviet Union in the area of the "industrial application of science and technology."

The communique also reflects the Soviet initiative for an accord "covering the fields of economic development and technological and industrial cooperation." It declares that the "two sides had a useful discussion of the Soviet proposal for a general agreement" on such an accord and that the Canadian side will further study the proposal. According to the communique, Ottawa and Moscow also agreed to explore ways to establish bilateral cooperation in the areas affected by their similar "natural conditions and economic problems" on a long-term basis. The two countries will also begin negotiations in early 1972 on extending the current trade agreement for an additional four years and will discuss a "Canadian proposal to set up a joint commission for consultations on trade"--an allusion to a further initiative by Ottawa to diversify its export markets in the aftermath of the U.S. surcharge on imports. (TASS on the 25th carried a summary of a Washington POST article outlining Canada's "serious concern" over the effect on the Canadian economy caused by Washington's emergency economic measures and U.S. influence on Canadian industry.)

U.S. ROLE Following his criticism of U.S. Government policies in his 19 October luncheon speech, Kosygin did not again raise so directly the contentious issues between the United States and Canada--judging by available accounts of his remarks. He was restrained even at his press conference on the 20th, when he was asked pointed questions related to

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
28 OCTOBER 1971

- 22 -

U.S.-Canadian relations. The longest Soviet account of the press conference, in IZVESTIYA on the 24th, included Kosygin's answer to a question raising the possibility of a Soviet-Canadian treaty of friendship--a friendship to which Trudeau referred in his dinner speech on the 18th, saying Canada would like to look northward and see the same kind of friends there that it sees to the south. Kosygin said he would "like to say that friendship in the north is assured for Canada; we will do everything we can to strengthen that friendship At the same time our friendship with Canada threatens no one, either in the south or in any other part of the world."

ARCTIC PROBLEMS

Throughout the visit Soviet media noted that the matter of cooperation in the Arctic is an issue of importance to both the USSR and Canada, and especially to Canada. The issue was discussed by Trudeau and Kosygin; the Soviet leader visited a factory which constructs buildings for the Far North; and a protocol was signed in Moscow on the 21st providing for an exchange of information on developing populated places in the Far North. In the joint communique on the visit, the two sides agreed to a meeting in Moscow of technical experts to work out possible areas of interest and organizational forms and methods of cooperation in the Arctic.

The communique reflects the lack of any Soviet-Canadian agreement on navigation in the Arctic, noting only that the two countries will expand cooperation in this area. But the communique does state that cooperation in the Arctic "could be aimed in particular at preventing pollution in Arctic waters and taking other measures for the preservation in these areas of the ecological balance which is of importance for the protection of the human environment." This may be an allusion to the scheduled U.S. Amchitka nuclear test; Moscow media have carried news reports on Canadian official and public protests over this test both before and during Kosygin's visit, without commenting in the context of the Kosygin visit. The communique made the point, within the listing of the international issues discussed by the two sides, that the Soviet Union and Canada intend "to continue furthering, jointly and separately, the adoption of partial disarmament measures, including the banning of underground nuclear tests, the reduction of military expenditures, and others."

Two remarks by Kosygin on the Arctic--one in his press conference on the 20th and another in his meeting with Canadian MP's the

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

28 OCTOBER 1971

- 23 -

same day--went unreported in Moscow media accounts of U.S. meetings. At the press conference Kosygin was reported as saying by Western sources that Arctic navigation is a matter for the Soviet Union and Canada and not for other countries and that there should be cooperation between the Soviet Union and Canada in this area. He was noncommittal in response to a question on the regulation of fishing off the Canadian coast, according to Montreal radio. The same radio said that Kosygin in response to a question told a group of Canadian MP's that Moscow is interested in bilateral agreements on Arctic problems with Canada; he made no specific reply to a proposal for an Arctic denuclearized zone.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

28 OCTOBER 1971

- 24 -

KOSYGIN IN CUBA

WARM HAVANA WELCOME FOR PREMIER REFLECTS CORDIAL RELATIONS

The cordial state of Soviet-Cuban relations was reflected in the effusive welcome accorded Premier Kosygin on his arrival at Havana's airport on 26 October for "a friendly visit" to Cuba. The belatedly announced visit--it was not made known until the 19th--comes on the return leg of Kosygin's visit to Canada and in the wake of the 12 October announcement of President Nixon's planned trip to the Soviet Union. The only monitored Cuban comment on that trip appeared in the course of an abusive broadside against the President in a Havana domestic service talk on the 13th by the freewheeling commentator Guido Garcia Inclan, who remarked that the President "is planning trips everywhere--to see Mao, to see Chiang Kai-shek, and now he says he is going to Russia."

Against the background of Castro's suspicions about great-power politics, voiced openly in past periods of strain in Soviet-Cuban relations, the timing of Kosygin's visit suggests that a prime motive is to reassure Castro that Cuba's interests will not suffer from new developments in Soviet-U.S. relations. Kosygin had made a similar, apparently hastily arranged stop in Havana from 26 to 30 June 1967 following the Glassboro talks with President Johnson. But the cordiality of Kosygin's reception this time attests to the marked improvement in Soviet-Cuban relations since 1967, when the two regimes were at odds, among other things, over revolutionary strategy for Latin America. Havana media gave the 1967 visit little publicity, and there was no communique at the close of the four-day talks. There has been no indication so far of how long Kosygin will stay in Cuba.

AIRPORT Havana made elaborate advance preparation for
RECEPTION Kosygin's arrival. The domestic service announced
 on the 25th that the minister of labor had issued
orders to enterprises, production units, and service centers
of metropolitan Havana to facilitate participation by workers
in the mass mobilization to welcome Kosygin. Kosygin was
greeted warmly at the airport by Castro, President Dorticos,
and other top Cuban leaders; the airport was decorated with
large pictures of Castro and Kosygin; a large flag-waving crowd
was on hand. Following a brief welcoming ceremony at the airport,

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
28 OCTOBER 1971

- 25 -

with no exchange of speeches, Kosygin joined Castro and Dorticos in an open limousine to be greeted, according to TASS, "by hundreds of thousands of Havana citizens who lined up along the 26-kilometer-long road from the airport to the capital." This greeting was in stark contrast to that accorded Kosygin--the last top Soviet leader to visit Cuba--on his 26 June 1967 arrival when, although he was met by Castro and Dorticos, no crowds welcomed him either at the airport or on the route to Havana. During the first two days of this visit Cuban media have given extensive coverage to Kosygin and his activities.

CASTRO, KOSYGIN
HOLD TALKS Kosygin and Castro started talks on the 27th on, according to TASS, a wide range of international problems of mutual interest and "on questions of further developing allround cooperation between the Soviet Union and Cuba." The talks passed, TASS said, "in an atmosphere of fraternal friendship, cordiality, and comradely frankness." While the latter term reflects areas of discord, the characterization marks a significant improvement over the state of relations in 1967, when the talks were described simply as "a frank exchange of opinions" on a number of mutual issues. Cuban media have not yet reported the initiation of talks between Kosygin and Castro.

Neither Soviet nor Cuban media have been specific as to the issues being discussed or the overall goals of Kosygin's visit. PRENSA LATINA said on the 20th that the visit "is a new demonstration of the excellent state of Cuban-Soviet relations" and that Kosygin's presence "will allow a direct contact for discussing important issues like bilateral relations and international affairs." The Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces weekly, VERDE OLIVO, on the 26th declared that the reception given Kosygin "is a demonstration of the degree of identification which relations between our two countries have reached." Soviet comment has simply suggested that the visit will "serve to strengthen the ties of friendship which link the peoples of the USSR and Cuba."

ECONOMIC ISSUES That bilateral economic relations--in particular Soviet aid to Cuba--are a major topic of discussion was indicated, however, both by Soviet comment on the visit and by Kosygin's only publicized remarks. To date the visit has brought only two brief speeches, one each by Castro and Kosygin during a visit on the 27th to the Alamar housing project where apartments are being constructed with

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

28 OCTOBER 1971

- 26 -

voluntary overtime work. Taking note of the "Cuban people's feelings towards the Soviet Union as demonstrated by the great welcome given us," Kosygin went on to state that "we are sure that if we return here in about two years, we will find a flourishing suburb of Havana. There will be a new socialist Havana here. We are certain that this is what will happen." Castro in his brief following remarks praised the efforts of the workers and asserted "I agree with Comrade Kosygin that in two years a whole city will have been erected here." He emphasized that Cuba "has received great assistance from the socialist camp, especially from the Soviet Union," adding later that Cuba has "had the opportunity of receiving foreign aid that has been of extraordinary importance to our country."

Similar emphasis on the extensive degree of Soviet aid to Cuba has permeated Moscow's comment on Kosygin's visit and on Soviet-Cuban relations. Thus a Moscow radio commentary in Spanish to Cuba on the 20th noted that the Soviet Union gives "considerable assistance to Cuba," citing specifically thermopower stations, the Havana fishing port, a plant for production of prefabricated parts for the construction industry, "and the greater part of the sugar industry enterprises." A dispatch from Havana in IZVESTIYA on the 26th, which said the Soviet Union "has made and is making a sizeable contribution to the cause of Soviet-Cuban friendship," pointed out that the USSR's "fraternal attitude" is "strikingly manifested by its economic and technical aid" in a number of areas. And a Moscow radio commentary for Cuban listeners on the 26th said that "there is hardly any branch of the Cuban economy which does not show the beneficial results of Soviet-Cuban cooperation." The commentary added that Cuba "for its part and on a reciprocal basis" sends the Soviet Union "its traditional export commodities--sugar, nickel concentrate, cigars, rum, and citrus fruits," but noted pointedly that "the USSR naturally bears in mind, above all, Cuba's situation." Still another commentary, also on the 26th, claimed that "the Cuban leaders have more than once stressed the decisive importance that the economic and military aid of the fatherland of socialism" has had for Cuba. It pointed out that in accordance with the recent trade agreement bilateral trade "has already passed the one billion rubles' mark" and that "today the USSR supplies to a great extent the needs of" Cuba in such items as fuel, petroleum derivatives, wood, steel, machinery, installations, chemical products, and consumer goods.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
28 OCTOBER 1971

- 27 -

SINO-KOREAN RELATIONS

ANNIVERSARY OF CPV ENTRY INTO KOREAN WAR MARKED IN DPRK, PRC

On 25 October, Pyongyang and Peking marked the 21st anniversary of the entry of the Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV) in the Korean War with receptions at the ambassadorial level and propaganda hailing Sino-Korean friendship. In keeping with themes established for last year's more lavish 20th anniversary celebrations, however, comment by the two sides does reflect divergent appraisals of their vital interests and mutual security. While Pyongyang propagandists have used the occasion to exploit the theme of mutual DPRK-PRC security interests to meet a common U.S. threat, Peking has adopted a more cautious stance in spelling out its relationship to the North Korean regime.

Differing views on the current status of Sino-Korean relations were reflected in the speeches by Hyon Chun-kuk, DPRK ambassador to Peking, and Su Yu, veteran military leader and currently PRC vice minister of national defense, at a Peking banquet commemorating the anniversary. Hyon referred twice to China as the "fraternal ally" of the Korean people, and he condemned the U.S. for "pushing the Nixon Doctrine" and aiding "the revived Japanese militarists" to realize their dream of the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere."

Su's speech, on the other hand, omitted any reference to the Nixon Doctrine, did not use the term "ally" to describe the current Sino-DPRK relationship, and played down the threat of a revival of militarism in Japan. Su confined his remarks to a routine review of the joint struggle during the Korean War and expressed his "deep confidence" that the Korean people "will surely win complete victory in their just struggle against U.S. imperialism and Japanese militarism and for the independent and peaceful unification of their fatherland."

Speeches by Kim Kwan-sop, vice chairman of the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, and Li Yun-chuan, PRC ambassador to the DPRK, at a Pyongyang anniversary reception reflected similar differences regarding the Sino-DPRK relationship. Kim lauded past Chinese contributions in "resisting American aggression" in Korea but also asserted that "the Korean people will in the future, too, continue to fight on relentlessly against U.S. imperialism and Japanese militarism, the common enemies, shoulder to shoulder with the Chinese people."

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
28 OCTOBER 1971

- 28 -

Li's remarks, however, contained only one reference to the "U.S. imperialist aggressors," a pro forma bow made within the context of the Korean War as a historical event. Li wished the Korean people success in realizing their future plans for "socialist revolution and socialist construction" but did not endorse Kim's call for a joint DPRK-PRC struggle against "U.S. imperialism and Japanese militarism."

In further contrast to Kim's address, Li failed even to trot out the theme of "Japanese militarism." The omission is in line with earlier indications that Peking has softened its exploitation of this theme in an effort to provide more fuel for pro-Peking forces within Japan. Peking's tactical shift on this issue was most clearly illustrated in a joint communique issued on 2 October by the China-Japan Friendship Association and a delegation of the Japanese Dietmen's League for Promoting the Restoration of Japan-China Diplomatic Relations. The Chinese side noted with unusual confidence that the Japanese people "will absolutely not allow Japanese militarism to take the road of aggression again."

KOREAN EDITORIAL The Peking press carried no editorial on the anniversary. (Last year a joint editorial marked the 20th anniversary; there was none the preceding year.) An editorial in NODONG SINMUN on 25 October argued that there exists an "invincible" friendship between the Korean and Chinese people's which "is sealed with blood and has withstood the trials of history." It characterized the dispatch of Chinese volunteers to fight "against the common enemy" 21 years ago as a "shining example of proletarian internationalism." The editorial is replete with terms such as "militant friendship and solidarity," "revolutionary comrades in arms," and "unbreakable bond" in descriptions of Korean-Chinese friendship.

Shifting its comment from a historical context to the present, NODONG SINMUN asserted that as a result of the "daily intensifying aggressive and war maneuvers of the U.S. imperialists and the Japanese militarists, the situation in our country and Asia is now tense." The editorial specifically condemned the U.S. for "still remaining in South Korea and running wild in their moves to ignite a new war of aggression in Korea and zealously drawing in even the revived Japanese militarists." "U.S. imperialists" and "Japanese militarists" were portrayed as working "hand in glove with each other" in their "criminal plots to fabricate 'two Chinas' and 'one Taiwan.'" The editorial

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
28 OCTOBER 1971

- 29 -

then charged the United States with "escalating and intensifying its war of aggression in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia and thereby gravely menacing peace in Asia and the world."

The theme of Asian unity was reflected in the editorial's call for peoples of all "revolutionary countries in Asia to unite" and "shatter the heinous machinations of aggression and war of the U.S. and Japanese reactionaries." Stressing the idea that Sino-DPRK friendship might serve as the backbone for a united Asia, the editorial pointed to the "firm unity between the Korean and Chinese people" and claimed joint determination "to fight together to the end against U.S. imperialism and Japanese militarism and to emerge victorious."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS
28 OCTOBER 1971

- 30 -

EASTERN EUROPE

SOVIET BLOC-YUGOSLAV CONTACTS MULTIPLY SINCE BREZHNEV VISIT

Soviet and East European reports of stepped-up contacts with Belgrade reflect the warming trend in Soviet bloc relations with the Yugoslavs in the wake of Brezhnev's late-September visit. Thus Belgrade and Warsaw media on the 24th carried a lengthy and warm communique on the just concluded visit of Polish Premier Jaroszewicz to the Yugoslav capital--the highest-level contact between Yugoslavia and a Soviet ally among the Warsaw Five since Hungarian Premier Fock's visit to Belgrade in June 1970.

A number of meetings on trade and economic ties have been publicized. PRAVDA reported on 21 October, for example, that USSR Gosplan Chairman Baybakov had received Yugoslav Ambassador Petic for talks on "future economic cooperation" between the two countries, and MTI announced on the 22d that the Hungarian and Yugoslav deputy foreign trade ministers had signed in Budapest a 1972 trade agreement providing for a 16-percent increase in the volume of exchange. TANJUG on the 22d and CTK on the 26th reported meetings in Prague and Bratislava, respectively, of two different joint economic cooperation commissions of the two countries.

While the meetings so far have remained chiefly in the governmental sphere, party relations are beginning to develop. In a party contact at a modest level, as reported by ADN on the 25th, "an SED Central Committee delegation" led by Werner Walde, head of the Cottbus SED executive, left for Belgrade "to acquaint itself with the activity of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia."

The communique on Jaroszewicz' 21-24 October visit to Belgrade, at the invitation of Yugoslav Premier Bijedic, reports that an invitation was extended not only to Bijedic for a return visit but also to Tito to visit Poland in his party as well as government capacity. Tito "accepted with pleasure," according to the communique. In discussing bilateral relations, the communique also states that "a significant role" has been played by cooperation "between the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and the PZPR." The 5 June 1970 communique on Hungarian Premier Fock's talks with the then Yugoslav Premier Ribicic had not mentioned party relations.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
28 OCTOBER 1971

- 31 -

The Bijedic-Jaroszewicz communique generally registers greater warmth and harmony than had been indicated in the 5 June 1970 Ribicic-Fock communique or the 30 June 1970 communique on Ribicic's talks with Kosygin in Moscow. The atmosphere of the talks is described, like that of the 1970 talks, as one of "frankness and friendship," but with the added notation now of "mutual understanding." The document notes that "the Polish side expressed its support for the nonaligned countries in their anti-imperialist struggle"--an echo of the avowal of Soviet support, in the 25 September Brezhnev-Tito statement, for "the anti-imperialist orientation of the policy of nonaligned countries." The 5 June 1970 document said only that Ribicic "informed" Fock of "the views of the Yugoslav Government on the policy of nonalignment" and that Fock said his government was "following with interest the activity of the Yugoslav Government in this field"; and the Kosygin-Ribicic communique the same month simply reported that the Yugoslav premier "acquainted the Soviet side with the principles of Yugoslavia's nonalignment policy." The present communique also takes its cue from the Tito-Brezhnev statement in recording agreement, in connection with the European situation, on the need for "recognition of and respect for existing borders."

MOSCOW, PRAGUE SHOW SENSITIVITY ON YUGOSLAV MANEUVERS

The new warmth of the period following Brezhnev's visit to Belgrade has been tempered somewhat by the heavily propagandized Yugoslav "Freedom 71" military exercises of 2-7 October, which were countered by the virtually simultaneous joint Soviet-Hungarian maneuvers across the border in western Hungary and evoked sharp Soviet and Czechoslovak rejoinders to Western press suggestions that the Yugoslav exercises were held to meet the threat posed by Moscow's "limited sovereignty" doctrine. But the Soviet bloc commentaries avoided directly impugning Yugoslav motives, choosing instead to direct their attacks ostensibly at Western press organs and to suggest that Yugoslavia was being used by Western propagandists.

A Zhuravskiy article in the Moscow PRAVDA, for example, deprecated the main Yugoslav propaganda line on the exercises--"all-people's defense"--by attacking TIME Magazine for raising "a new bugaboo," the "total mobilization of Yugoslavia . . . from youths of premilitary age to people exempt from military service." Still ostensibly attacking TIME, the PRAVDA article asked rhetorically: "If it is a war for 'freedom,' then, one wonders, against whom?"

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
28 OCTOBER 1971

- 32 -

The article also scored the Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA for commenting that "the Warsaw Pact reacted with lightning speed" by holding exercises in western Hungary.

An 11 October dispatch in the Bratislava PRAVDA by the paper's Belgrade correspondent, entitled "Belgrade Diary; the Fall is Not All Sunny," took the tack that Western "poison pens," temporarily silenced by Brezhnev's visit, were reactivated "when the great Freedom 71 exercises were held in Yugoslavia." The dispatch noted "official" Yugoslav denials that "this was a defense preparation against a 'socialist aggression.'" Characterizing Yugoslavia in general as "the target of the intrigues of hostile propaganda," the paper remarked that "the shaping of socialist society in Yugoslavia is certainly not an easy matter, in view of the heritage of the past." In a similar vein, it remarked on the subject of the Yugoslav nationality problem that "the underestimation of nationalism is not a mass phenomenon" or "a typical feature of contemporary Yugoslavia."

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